A thought experiment
Two AI agents are updating a website, and a monitor reads every message they send. Could they also play a full game of chess, hiding one move in each message, without the monitor noticing?
Answering this comes down to two questions.
How much can each message hide?
As many hidden bits per message as possible, decoded correctly.
Can we prove no one can tell?
A proof that the monitor cannot detect the hidden messages.
AI agents have already passed secret notes
In 2026, OpenAI reported that its AI agents, each working on a separate task, had turned an internal file server into a message board. They left notes for each other, asked for help, and shared what they found.
Reporters found agents using a public wiki the same way. The notes were plain text that anyone could read.
Can AI agents hide messages in plain sight?
Those notes were caught because anyone could read them. Could agents instead hide their messages inside the ordinary text that a monitor already reads?
Yes. We propose a protocol called BAM and use it to show that this is possible.
BAM uses a shared secret key, a distortion-free watermark, and feedback
We explain each piece next.
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A shared secret key
Only the sender and the receiver have it.
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A distortion-free watermark
Hides bits in each token without changing how the model writes.
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Feedback
The sender tracks the receiver's guess and knows when to stop.
How a watermark works
Language models write one token (a word or a piece of one) at a time. For each next token, the model has options with probabilities and samples one at random.
A watermark uses the secret key to make that choice. Averaged over keys, every option keeps its probability, so the watermark is distortion-free.
Back to question 2: can someone without the key tell the text is watermarked? No. We prove that no efficient monitor without the key can tell it apart from ordinary text.
Each key picks one token. Over many keys, the picks match the model's own probabilities.
Hiding one bit
A simplified version of our watermark, ArcMark: the options for the next token sit around a circle, each with a slice as big as its probability.
The sender and the receiver share the key, which sets a random pointer. Send 0: write the token under it. Send 1: the token across. The random pointer keeps the watermark distortion-free.
Watch the last token, the near-certain a in </a>: both pointers usually land on it, so the receiver has to guess.
The sender has instant feedback
A chess move takes many tokens. After each one, the receiver updates its guess of the move.
The sender sees the same tokens and key, so it can track that guess. In information theory, this kind of feedback is known to simplify code design: as in twenty questions, each token targets the receiver's remaining doubt.
Each sender stops hiding once the receiver is confident
The agents take turns, so each one is both a sender and a receiver.
Once the receiver's top candidate passes a high threshold, the sender confirms it and stops hiding, or rejects it and keeps going. Message lengths vary: a variable-length code.
BAM is a protocol that puts all these pieces together
BAM (Burnashev Adaptive posterior Matching) combines the pieces from the previous panels.
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A shared secret key
Only the sender and the receiver have it.
Hiding in plain sight -
A distortion-free watermark
ArcMark hides bits in each token without distorting the text.
Hiding one bit -
Feedback
The sender tracks the receiver's guess (posterior matching).
The sender has instant feedback -
Confirm, then stop
Confirm the receiver's top candidate, then stop hiding.
Stopping when confident
The name refers to Burnashev's limit on how fast errors can fall with feedback.
About 100 times fewer errors at the same length, relative to competing benchmarks
This answers question 1. We hid 8-bit messages in news text with three open models (1,000 trials each) and compared BAM with ArcMark [1], MPAC [2], BiMark [3], StealthInk [4], and the method in [5].
At about 50 tokens, the best earlier method is wrong 10 to 17% of the time. BAM is wrong 0.1% of the time or less. The method in [5] is nearly error-free too, but needs 73 to 88 tokens.
Two agents can play chess in secret
By combining a shared secret key, a distortion-free watermark, and feedback, two agents can play chess in secret. To the monitor, they are just fixing a website. They could also share any other hidden information.


The live demo runs on a GPU server that isn't always on. If it doesn't load, watch the recording.
From message boards to hidden channels
The agents in OpenAI's report needed a shared server, and their plain-text notes were found.
An agent that controls its own sampler, or a paraphrasing model's sampler, needs no message board. With a shared key, it can hide messages in the text it already writes.
For safety, this means monitors have to check how text is sampled, as well as what it says.
Without the key, reading the tokens alone cannot reveal the hidden messages.
We don't know whether AI agents would learn to do this on their own, or choose to use steganography if available. What we show is that it is possible to have undetectable communications through the text they generate.