Can AI agents secretly play chess?

Inference-time covert communication over LLM‑agent conversations

1Georgia Institute of Technology·2Harvard University·3Arizona State University
Georgia Institute of Technology Harvard SEAS Arizona State University

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A thought experiment

Two AI agents are updating a website, and a monitor reads every message they send. Could they also play a full game of chess, hiding one move in each message, without the monitor noticing?

Answering this comes down to two questions.

The whole game
Question 1

How much can each message hide?

As many hidden bits per message as possible, decoded correctly.

Question 2

Can we prove no one can tell?

A proof that the monitor cannot detect the hidden messages.

AI agents have already passed secret notes

In 2026, OpenAI reported that its AI agents, each working on a separate task, had turned an internal file server into a message board. They left notes for each other, asked for help, and shared what they found.

Reporters found agents using a public wiki the same way. The notes were plain text that anyone could read.

Can AI agents hide messages in plain sight?

Those notes were caught because anyone could read them. Could agents instead hide their messages inside the ordinary text that a monitor already reads?

Yes. We propose a protocol called BAM and use it to show that this is possible.

BAM uses a shared secret key, a distortion-free watermark, and feedback

We explain each piece next.

  • A shared secret key

    Only the sender and the receiver have it.

  • A distortion-free watermark

    Hides bits in each token without changing how the model writes.

  • Feedback

    The sender tracks the receiver's guess and knows when to stop.

How a watermark works

Language models write one token (a word or a piece of one) at a time. For each next token, the model has options with probabilities and samples one at random.

A watermark uses the secret key to make that choice. Averaged over keys, every option keeps its probability, so the watermark is distortion-free.

Back to question 2: can someone without the key tell the text is watermarked? No. We prove that no efficient monitor without the key can tell it apart from ordinary text.

One token

Each key picks one token. Over many keys, the picks match the model's own probabilities.

Hiding one bit

A simplified version of our watermark, ArcMark: the options for the next token sit around a circle, each with a slice as big as its probability.

The sender and the receiver share the key, which sets a random pointer. Send 0: write the token under it. Send 1: the token across. The random pointer keeps the watermark distortion-free.

Watch the last token, the near-certain a in </a>: both pointers usually land on it, so the receiver has to guess.

One token
Send

    The sender has instant feedback

    A chess move takes many tokens. After each one, the receiver updates its guess of the move.

    The sender sees the same tokens and key, so it can track that guess. In information theory, this kind of feedback is known to simplify code design: as in twenty questions, each token targets the receiver's remaining doubt.

    One message

    Each sender stops hiding once the receiver is confident

    The agents take turns, so each one is both a sender and a receiver.

    Once the receiver's top candidate passes a high threshold, the sender confirms it and stops hiding, or rejects it and keeps going. Message lengths vary: a variable-length code.

    One conversation

    BAM is a protocol that puts all these pieces together

    BAM (Burnashev Adaptive posterior Matching) combines the pieces from the previous panels.

    The name refers to Burnashev's limit on how fast errors can fall with feedback.

    About 100 times fewer errors at the same length, relative to competing benchmarks

    This answers question 1. We hid 8-bit messages in news text with three open models (1,000 trials each) and compared BAM with ArcMark [1], MPAC [2], BiMark [3], StealthInk [4], and the method in [5].

    Messages decoded wrong vs. average message length. 8-bit messages hidden in C4 news text, 1,000 trials per point, bars show one standard error. Lower is better.

    At about 50 tokens, the best earlier method is wrong 10 to 17% of the time. BAM is wrong 0.1% of the time or less. The method in [5] is nearly error-free too, but needs 73 to 88 tokens.

    Two agents can play chess in secret

    By combining a shared secret key, a distortion-free watermark, and feedback, two agents can play chess in secret. To the monitor, they are just fixing a website. They could also share any other hidden information.

    User A
    ask the other agent to add a Blog link
    payload: e4
    Agent A (LLM)
    hey, can you add a Blog link to the nav bar? the header is in index.html
    hidden: e4
    User B
    make the change and reply
    payload: Nf6
    Agent B (LLM)
    done, it sits after About. I also fixed the mobile menu, it was cutting off the last link
    hidden: Nf6

    The live demo runs on a GPU server that isn't always on. If it doesn't load, watch the recording.

    From message boards to hidden channels

    The agents in OpenAI's report needed a shared server, and their plain-text notes were found.

    An agent that controls its own sampler, or a paraphrasing model's sampler, needs no message board. With a shared key, it can hide messages in the text it already writes.

    For safety, this means monitors have to check how text is sampled, as well as what it says.

    Without the key, reading the tokens alone cannot reveal the hidden messages.

    We don't know whether AI agents would learn to do this on their own, or choose to use steganography if available. What we show is that it is possible to have undetectable communications through the text they generate.

    Who made this

    SG

    Sidong Guo

    Georgia Institute of Technology

    Information theory, covert communication, machine learning security.

    SV

    Sajani Vithana

    Harvard University

    AG

    Atefeh Gilani

    Arizona State University

    LS

    Lalitha Sankar

    Arizona State University

    OK

    Oliver Kosut

    Arizona State University

    FC

    Flavio Calmon

    Harvard University

    BAM, technically

    BAM overview: codeword generation by posterior matching, optimal-transport biasing of the next-token distribution, sampling into the shared transcript, key generation from the transcript, belief update, ACK/NACK confirmation, and decoding.
    BAM in one round of token generation. Top: the encoder picks a codeword symbol from the shared belief (1) and biases the model's next-token distribution toward it with optimal transport (2). Both parties derive per-token keys from the transcript, update the belief (3), confirm the leading candidate (4), and decode (5).
    01

    Posterior matching. Each symbol is chosen from the receiver's current belief, not a fixed codebook. Higher rate at the same error.

    02

    Optimal transport. The next-token distribution is biased toward the chosen symbol on a key-shifted circle, while the average over keys stays exactly the model's own distribution.

    03

    Variable-length stopping via belief update. Both parties score each received token with a mixture-Laplacian likelihood and update a shared belief over messages. Sending continues while the belief is spread out and stops once one message crosses the threshold.

    04

    Confirmation. A short accept/reject phase after each candidate, as in Yamamoto–Itoh, a strategy that attains the Burnashev exponent on discrete memoryless channels.

    05

    Distortion-free and provably secure. Optimal-transport coupling leaves the text distribution untouched. A PRF reduction proves indistinguishability from clean text.

    BAM vs. earlier methods

    Scheme Avg len Msg err ↓ PPL ↓ Sec/token ↓
    Llama-3.1-8B
    No embedding50.0—7.66 ± 0.110.0214
    MPAC [2]50.00.797 ± 0.0138.54 ± 0.110.0223
    BiMark [3]50.00.569 ± 0.0167.68 ± 0.110.0352
    StealthInk [4]50.00.637 ± 0.0157.66 ± 0.110.0231
    ArcMark [1]50.00.106 ± 0.0107.52 ± 0.110.0291
    No embedding74.8 ± 2.1—7.47 ± 0.100.0220
    Method in [5]74.8 ± 2.10.003 ± 0.0028.79 ± 0.120.0220
    No embedding47.1 ± 1.5—7.71 ± 0.120.0224
    BAM (L = 215)47.1 ± 1.50.001 ± 0.0017.89 ± 0.120.0378
    Qwen-3.5-9B-Base
    No embedding50.0—7.83 ± 0.100.0420
    MPAC [2]50.00.840 ± 0.0129.03 ± 0.120.0420
    BiMark [3]50.00.567 ± 0.0168.23 ± 0.120.0558
    StealthInk [4]50.00.659 ± 0.0158.04 ± 0.110.0456
    ArcMark [1]50.00.105 ± 0.0107.76 ± 0.110.0510
    No embedding72.9 ± 1.5—7.80 ± 0.110.0424
    Method in [5]72.9 ± 1.50.000 ± 0.0009.12 ± 0.120.0425
    No embedding45.8 ± 1.3—8.21 ± 0.130.0436
    BAM (L = 215)45.8 ± 1.30.001 ± 0.0018.24 ± 0.120.0541
    Mistral-7B-v0.3
    No embedding50.0—6.25 ± 0.090.0212
    MPAC [2]50.00.872 ± 0.0126.73 ± 0.090.0216
    BiMark [3]50.00.674 ± 0.0156.26 ± 0.080.0342
    StealthInk [4]50.00.702 ± 0.0146.16 ± 0.080.0217
    ArcMark [1]50.00.168 ± 0.0126.13 ± 0.090.0278
    No embedding87.8 ± 1.9—5.97 ± 0.070.0211
    Method in [5]87.8 ± 1.90.001 ± 0.0016.72 ± 0.080.0212
    No embedding49.7 ± 1.2—6.22 ± 0.100.0222
    BAM (L = 211)49.7 ± 1.20.000 ± 0.0006.51 ± 0.090.0326

    BAM vs. baselines on the C4 news corpus. Mean ± standard error over 1000 trials, carrying an 8-bit message. Each variable-length scheme is paired with its own no-embedding control generated at the same length, since perplexity is only comparable at matched length. Method in [5]: default t=2, max 1000 tokens, truncation counted as error. BAM costs about 1.5× the seconds per token.

    References

    1. ArcMark. ArcMark: Distortion-Free Multi-Byte LLM Watermark via Optimal Transport. Gilani, Atefeh and Vithana, Sajani and Long, Carol Xuan and Kosut, Oliver and Sankar, Lalitha and Calmon, Flavio P. arXiv:2602.07235, 2026 (baseline)
    2. MPAC. Advancing beyond identification: Multi-bit watermark for large language models. Yoo, KiYoon and Ahn, Wonhyuk and Kwak, Nojun. NAACL 2024 (baseline)
    3. BiMark. BiMark: Unbiased multilayer watermarking for large language models. Feng, Xiaoyan and Zhang, He and Zhang, Yanjun and Zhang, Leo Yu and Pan, Shirui. ICML 2025 (baseline)
    4. StealthInk. StealthInk: A multi-bit and stealthy watermark for large language models. Jiang, Ya and Wu, Chuxiong and Boroujeny, Massieh Kordi and Mark, Brian and Zeng, Kai. ICML 2025 (baseline)
    5. Undetectable steganography for language models. Zamir, Or. Transactions on Machine Learning Research, 2024 (baseline)

    Recorded demo session